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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CONTRACTORS NOT PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED BY SCHOOL BoARD
RESOLUTION
Contractors brought Article 78 proceedings to set aside a resolution of the
New York City Board of Education which disqualified the contractors from
bidding on school construction contracts because of an "under-the-table" agree-
ment in favor of one contractor, a deal occasioned by both contractors sub-
mitting identical low bids. The supreme court entered an order granting the
petition and the school board appealed; the Appellate Division virtually dis-
missed the petition on the merits, and the contractors appealed to the Court
of Appeals. Held: affirmed, one judge dissenting, the contractors are not
permanently disqualified by the resolution and are hence free to renew their
application for prequalification based on their past experience and performance.
Caristo Construction Corp. v. Rubin, 10 N.Y.2d 538, 180 N.E.2d 794, 225
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1962).1
The Caristo Construction Corporation (Caristo) and Mars Associates
Inc., along with Normel Construction Corp. (Mars-Normel), were construction
corporations which accounted for most of the school construction in New York
City, due to the low bids that the two companies consistently submitted. On
one job identical bids were submitted and the Superintendent of Plant Design
and Construction of the Board of Education, Weiss, informed them that he
would award the contract to Caristo. Mars-Normel threatened court action
on the grounds that Weiss was acting outside of his authority. To avoid this,
Caristo offered to pay to Mars-Normel $11,000.00 in repayment of the average
expense incurred by Mars-Normel in preparing and submitting a bid. Mars-
Normel accepted, but insisted on a "sham" coin-flipping, the usual procedure
used by the Board of Education to settle tie bids, to avoid leaving the impres-
sion on the building community that Caristo had been 'awarded the contract
because of greater prominence. When the Board of Education learned of the
coin-flipping by Weiss, but without knowledge of the agreement between the
companies and without knowledge that the coin-flipping was a sham, they
insisted that Weiss had no authority to so act, and conducted their own coin-
flipping which Caristo won. Slightly over a year later, because of a furor about
the condition of the schools and school systems in New York City, which
arose in connection with a hotly contested mayoral election, the City's Com-
missioner of Investigation looked into the school situation and uncovered this
alleged compromise. He reported this to a member of the Board of Education
who, without notice to any interested parties, introduced a sudden resolution
late in the agenda of a board meeting to disqualify both Caristo and Mars-
1. 15 A.D.2d 561, 222 N.Y.S.2d 998 (2d Dep't 1961) (mem.), modifying 30 Misc. 2d
185, 221 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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Normel from bidding on a contract presently in negotiation and any future
contracts.
Caristo and Mars-Normel instituted separate Article 78 proceedings, peti-
tioning the Supreme Court, Special Term, to compel the Board of Education
and Weiss to deliver plans and specifications to them so that they could prepare
a bid for the construction of a new school, to direct the Board to accept the
bid and award the contract to the petitioners if either was the low bidder, and
to overrule and rescind the resolution disqualifying the petitioners. After the
initiation of these proceedings, the Board advertised for bids on another school.
Caristo instituted a second proceeding, the same as the first. Mars-Normel
instead moved for a stay of any bid openings or the award of any contracts
until the first proceedings were determined, and for a similar order as to any
future bids and awards. Both motions were granted. The Board, as part of its
return to the Court, submitted a copy of its resolution, which stated that it
was based on the report of the Commissioner of Investigation, but failed to
submit the Commissioner's report. The Court felt that this was inadequate and
held hearings to determine the evidence upon which the Board based its
conclusions.
On the basis of the hearings and the evidence obtained therefrom, the
Court found that the resolution was not a part of the agenda of the meeting
at which it was passed, but was added without notice to anyone,2 at almost
the last moment; that the members of the Board had read the report of the
Commissioner of Investigation only briefly, if at all; none of the members had
ever read the minutes of the hearings before the Commissioner which formed
the basis for the report; that all of the members who read the report accepted
the facts stated therein as true without further inquiry; that some of the
members voted for the resolution because of the recommendation of one
member; that one member thought that petitioners had been guilty of collusive
bidding; that three of the nine members did not vote; that none of the mem-
bers save one was concerned about the reliability of petitioners to perform
properly, diligently, expeditiously, or competently any future contracts; that
the petitioners "were well known to the board, bad done many million dollars
of work, and their competence, honesty and integrity in the performance of
their contracts, general reliability, financial responsibility, and other factors
necessary to fully perform their contracts had never previously been chal-
lenged"; that the low bids of petitioners had saved the Board millions of
dollars in the past; and that the elimination of petitioners from future bidding,
due to the small number of bidders in the area, would eliminate the effective-
ness of public competitive bidding. In addition, the Court found that some
members of the Board voted for the resolution because they sought to punish
2. The court noted that the petitioners were not entitled to notice of such a hearing
because an invitation to bid for a contract is not a property right. Haskell-Gilroy v.
Young, 10 A.D.2d 629, 196 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d Dep't 1960) (men.), affirming 20 Misc. 2d
294, 189 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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petitioners, and in so doing acted outside their authority which was merely
to determine whether petitioners were qualified to assume the responsibility
of the construction job. Where the Board so exceeds its authority, the Court
can act to remedy the situation.3 Further, it found the agreement was not
illegal or against public policy, and that this did not really have bearing in any
event since Caristo was selected by the Board by an honest coin-flipping. Thus,
the Court held that the actions of the Board were arbitrary and capricious,
based upon no legal evidence at all but upon a hearsay report, and that to
protect the interest of the public in effective competitive bidding, the petitions
must be granted and the resolution of the Board set aside.
4
The Appellate Division5 modified the order of the Special Term by striking
out the first three decretal paragraphs6 and substituting therefor a paragraph
dismissing the petition on the merits, and as so modified, affirming it, but, in
effect, reversing the decision of the lower court. The Appellate Court held that
it could not substitute its judgment for that of the Board of Education since
there was a substantial factual basis for the making of its resolution.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division because it found
that though it doubted the Board's power permanently to disqualify petitioners,
the resolution was not a permanent disqualification, and they could renew their
applications for qualification, based upon their past record and experience,
at any time. One Judge dissented, feeling that an indefinite disqualification was
the same as a permanent one, and that based upon petitioners' past record,
experience, responsibility, and bids, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed and that of the Special Term reinstated.
It is extremely difficult to reach an opinion as to the effect of the Court
of Appeals holding in Caristo. The Supreme Court's detailed opinion followed
a clear, logical process arriving at what seemed to be an equitable conclusion.
The Appellate Division dismissed on the merits and announced that findings
of fact and law inconsistent with this were to be deleted and new findings
substituted, without specifying these new findings. This certainly did not indi-
cate the reasons for its decision, nor did it indicate the substantial factual
basis that the Court said made the determination of the Board of Education
conclusive. The Court of Appeals decision is even less clear. Did the Court
mean that the Board of Education could continue to pass resolutions for each
contract disqualifying petitioners from bidding so long as none of the resolu-
tions resulted in a permanent disqualification? Such a result can easily be
implied, and would result in the situation that the Supreme Court met head-on,
but the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals seemed to avoid.
T. C. L
3. Schwab v. McElligott, 282 N.Y. 182, 26 N.E.2d 10 (1940).
4. Caristo Construction Corp. v. Rubin, 30 Misc. 2d 185, 221 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sup.
Ct. 1961).
5. Caristo Construction Corp. v. Rubin, 15 A.D.2d 561, 222 N.Y.S.2d 998 (2d Dep't
1961) (mem.).
6. Supra note 4, at 208-209, 221 N.Y.S.2d at 977-978.
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